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Tracking and Representing Others’
Mental States
Stephen A. Butter ll
<s.butter ll@warwick.ac.uk>
This is a slightly longer version of a chapter published in Andrews and Beck
(eds), Routledge Handbook on Animal Minds
1. Introduction
Few things matter more than the mental states of those nearby. Their ignor-
ance de nes limits on cooperation and presents opportunities to exploit in
competition. (If she’s seen where you stashed those mealworms she’ll pilfer
them when you’re gone, leaving you without breakfast. And you won’t get
that grape if he hears you sneaking past.) What others feel, see and know
can also provide information about events otherwise beyond your ken. It’s
no surprise, then, that abilities to track others’ mental states are widespread.
Many animals including scrub jays (Clayton, Dally and Emery 2007), ravens
(Bugnyar, Reber and Buckner 2016), goats (Kaminski, Call and Tomasello
2006), dogs (Kaminski et al. 2009), ringtailed lemurs (Sandel, MacLean and
Hare 2011), monkeys (Burkart and Heschl 2007; Hattori, Kuroshima and
Fujita 2009) and chimpanzees (Melis, Call and Tomasello 2006; Karg et al.
2015) reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about
another’s mental states. What underpins such abilities to track others’ mental
states?
There is a simple and quite widely accepted answer. As in humans, so
in other animals: abilities to track others’ mental states are underpinned by
representations of those mental states. Some people seem less con dent about
lemurs or monkeys than chimpanzees, perhaps in part because these animals’
abilities to track others’ mental states appear less exible (Hare et al. 2003;
Burkart and Heschl 2007). Others caution that there is currently insucient
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evidence to accept that any nonhuman animals ever represent others’ mental
states (e.g. Whiten 2013; Heyes 2015). But overall the simple answer—abilities
to track others’ mental states are underpinned by representations of those
mental states—is endorsed by many of those cited above for at least some
nonhuman animals.
The simple answer will appear inescapable if we assume that tracking
others’ mental states must, as a matter of logic, involve representing others’
mental states. But this assumption is incorrect. Contrast representing a
mental state with tracking one. For you to track someone’s mental state (such
as a belief that there is food behind that rock) is for there to be a process in
you which nonaccidentally depends in some way on whether she has that
mental state. Representing mental states is one way, but not the only way,
of tracking them. In principle it is possible to track mental states without
representing them. For example, it is possible, within limits, to track what
another visually represents by representing her line of sight only. More
sophisticated illustrations of how you could in principle track mental states
without representing them abound (e.g. Buckner 2014, pp. 571). What many
experiments actually measure is whether certain subjects can track mental
states: the question is whether changes in what another sees, believes or
desires are reected in subjects’ choices of route, caching behaviours, or
anticipatory looking (say). It is surely possible to infer what is represented
by observing what is tracked. But such inferences are never merely logical.
To learn what underpins abilities to track others’ mental states, we would
therefore need to evaluate competing hypotheses. In recognising this, we
immediately face two requirements. The  rst requirement is a theoretically
coherent, empirically motivated and readily testable hypothesis on which
tracking mental states does not involve representing mental states. This
requirement is currently unmet (Halina 2015, p. 486; Heyes 2015, p. 322) and,
as the next section argues, surprisingly dicult to meet.
2. Pure Behaviour Reading: Cast the Demon Out
Pure behaviour reading is the process of tracking others’ behaviours, in-
cluding their future behaviours, independently of any knowledge, or beliefs
about, their mental states. Can research on pure behaviour reading supply
hypotheses on which tracking mental states does not involve representing
mental states?
Contrast two approaches to theorising about behaviour reading. One
focusses on the behaviourist counterpart of Laplace’s demon. The behaviour
reading demon has unlimited cognitive capacities, perfect knowledge of
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Figure 1: Read this! An analysis of the steps performed by the le and right
hands in preparing nettles to eat without getting stung. Source: Byrne
(2003),  gure 1.
history and can conceptualise behaviours in any way imaginable. Although
blind to mental states, it can predict others’ future behaviours at least as well
as any mindreader (Andrews 2005, p. 528; Halina 2015, p. 483). Invoking
the behaviour reading demon makes vivid the point that the existence of
abilities to track others’ mental states does not logically entail representations
of mental states. But the behaviour reading demon is little use when it comes
to generating testable hypotheses. Not even the most exacting rigour requires
excluding the possibility that an animal is a behaviour reading demon before
accepting that it can represent mental states.
The other approach to theorising about behaviour reading concerns actual
animals rather than imaginary demons. Byrne (2003) studied a particularly
sophisticated case of behaviour reading in Rwandan mountain gorillas. The
procedure for preparing a nettle to eat while avoiding contact with its stings
is shown in  gure 1. It involves multiple steps. Some steps may be repeated
varying numbers of times, and not all steps occur in every case. The fact
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that gorillas can learn this and other procedures for acquiring and preparing
food by observing others’ behaviour suggests that they have sophisticated
behaviour reading abilities (Byrne 2003, p. 513). If we understood the nature
of these behaviour reading abilities and their limits, we might be better able
to understand their abilities to track mental states too.
We seek an account of pure behaviour reading to generate testable hypo-
theses about tracking mental states without representing them. This requires
us to focus on the actual behaviour reading capacities of particular animals.
Unfortunately relatively little is known about pure behaviour reading, even
in humans.
Behaviour reading involves at least three components: segmentation,
categorisation and structure extraction. First, it is necessary to segment con-
tinuous streams of bodily movements into units of interest. Adult humans can
readily impose boundaries on continuous sequences of behaviour (Newtson
and Engquist 1976; Zacks et al. 2001; Kurby and Zacks 2008), as can infants
(Baldwin and Baird 2001). Segmentation is probably complicated by the fact
that units are not performed one aer another but can overlap, as when you
bat away a y while squeezing a lemon and talking on the phone. A further
complication is that identifying unit boundaries probably involves taking into
account the context in which a behaviour occurs (Newtson, Engquist and
Bois 1977, p. 847). How could segmentation be achieved? Commencement
and completion of a goal or subgoal typically coincide with dramatic changes
in physical features of the movements such as velocity (Zacks, Tversky and
Iyer 2001). Baldwin and Baird express this idea graphically with the notion of
a ‘ballistic trajectory’ that provides an ‘envelope’ for a unit of action (Baldwin
and Baird 2001, p. 174). Research using schematic animations has shown that
adults can use a variety of movement features to group behavioural chunks
into units (Zacks 2004; Hard, Tversky and Lang 2006).
A second component of behaviour reading is categorisation. Adult hu-
mans spontaneously label units of behaviour as ‘running’, ‘grasping’, or
‘searching’ (say). This is categorisation: two units which may involve quite
dierent bodily con gurations and joint displacements and which may oc-
cur in quite dierent contexts are nevertheless treated as equivalent. How
are categories identi ed in pure behaviour reading? One possibility is that
some categorisation processes involve mirroring motor cognition. When a
monkey or a human observes another’s action, there are oen motor rep-
resentations in her that would normally occur if it were her, the observer,
who was performing the action (see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 2010 for
reviews). Further, in preparing, performing and monitoring actions, units
of action are represented motorically in ways that abstract from particular
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Figure 2: A routine action with a complex, hierarchical structure.
patterns of joint displacements and bodily con gurations (e.g. Rizzolatti et al.
1988; Rizzolatti, Fogassi and Gallese 2001; Umiltà et al. 2001; Hamilton and
Graon 2008; Cattaneo, Sandrini and Schwarzbach 2010; Koch et al. 2010; Vil-
liger, Chandrasekharan and Welsh 2010). And, in observation as performance,
what is represented motorically depends on contextual factors such as the
presence of particular objects on which certain actions might be performed
(Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011). Taken together, these  ndings indicate that one
process by which units of action are categorised is the process by which, in
other contexts, your own actions are prepared.
A third component of behaviour reading is structure extraction. Many
actions can be analysed as a structure of goals hierarchically ordered by the
means-ends relation (see  gure 2 for an illustration.) A behaviour reader
should be able to extract some or all of this structure. But how? Units of
behaviour that are all involved in bringing about a single outcome are more
likely to occur in succession than chunks not so related. This suggests that
transitional probabilities in the sequence of units could in principle be used
to identify larger structures of units, much as phonemes can be grouped
into words by means of tracking transitional probabilities (Saran, Newport
and Aslin 1996; Gómez and Gerken 2000). We know that human adults can
learn to group small chunks of behaviour into larger word-like units on the
basis of statistical features alone (Baldwin et al. 2008). A statistical learning
mechanism required for discerning such units is automatic (Fiser and Aslin
2001), domain-general (Kirkham, Slemmer and Johnson 2002) and probably
present in human infants (Saran et al. 2007) as well as other species including
monkeys (Hauser, Newport and Aslin 2001), pigeons (Herbranson and Shimp
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2016), songbirds (Abe and Watanabe 2011) and rats (Toro and Trobalón 2005;
Murphy, Mondragón and Murphy 2008). It is therefore plausible that at least
some animals’ pure behaviour reading abilities enable them to extract some
of the hierarchical structure of actions.
Our primary concern here with behaviour reading is as a potential basis
for abilities to track others’ mental states without representing them. But
behaviour reading is plausibly important in other ways. In mindreaders,
behaviour reading is thought to be useful or even necessary for identifying
intentions and other mental states (Newtson, Engquist and Bois 1977, p. 861;
Baldwin et al. 2001, p. 708). Behaviour reading may also matter for eciently
representing events (Kurby and Zacks 2008), identi ng the likely eects of
actions (Byrne 1999), predicting when an event likely to be of interest will
occur (Swallow and Zacks 2008, p. 121), and learning through observation
how to do things (Byrne 2003). And of course a special case of pure beha-
viour reading, ‘speech perception’, underpins communication by language in
humans.
What are the limits of pure behaviour reading? While little is currently
known about pure behaviour reading outside of communication by language,
it is perhaps reasonable to assume that structure extraction depends on
domain-general learning mechanisms. Aer all, such mechanisms appear
sucient and there is currently little evidence for domain-speci c mechan-
isms. This assumption allows us to make conjectures about the limits of
pure behaviour reading. One limit concerns the kinds of structure which
animals of a given species might extract. How complex are the patterns of
behaviour which can be extracted? One hypothesis is that, humans at their
most reective aside, animals can usually learn and identify only those pat-
terns which can be captured by a regular grammar (Fitch and Friederici 2012).
Another, perhaps more readily exploitable hypothesis concerns non-adjacent
dependencies. There is a non-adjacent dependency in my behaviour when,
for example, my now having a line of sight to an object that is currently
unobtainable because of a competitor’s presence results in me retrieving the
object at some arbitrary later time when the competitor is absent. In this case,
my retrieving the object depends on my having had it in my line of sight,
but there is an arbitrary interval between these events. The hypothesis is
that structures involving non-adjacent dependencies are relatively dicult to
learn and identify, and that diculty increases as the number of non-adjacent
dependencies increases.1
1 Compare de Vries et al. (2012). Of course, whether non-adjacent dependencies are intrins-
ically dicult depends on the cognitive architecture (Uddén et al. 2012). There is evidence
that monkeys (Ravignani et al. 2013) and chimpanzees (Sonnweber, Ravignani and Fitch
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To generalise, suppose we assume that extracting structure in pure be-
haviour reading involves domain-general learning mechanisms only. Then
whenever an animal’s abilities to track others’ mental states are underpinned
by pure behaviour reading only, her abilities to learn and identify patterns
should be subject to domain-general limits. Since birdsongs are discriminable
and involve diverse behavioural structures (Berwick et al. 2011), we might
take the Birdsong Limit as a rough working hypothesis: structures not found
in birdsong cannot be extracted in pure behaviour reading.
Although not designed to test such limits, some existing experimental
designs involve features which plausibly exclude explaining subjects’ per-
formance in terms of pure behaviour reading only. To illustrate, consider
the sequence of events in the ‘misinformed’ condition of Hare, Call and To-
masello (2001, Experiment 1). A competitor observes food being placed [A],
the competitor’s access is blocked [B], stu happens [XN ], food is moved
[C], more stu happens [Y N ], and the competitor’s access is restored [D].
Finding evidence that chimpanzees can learn to identify patterns of this form
[ABXNCY ND] and use them to predict the conspeci cs’ behaviours would
represent a major discovery.
While it is probably impossible and certainly unnecessary to exclude the
possibility that an animal is a behaviour reading demon, it turns out to be
quite straightforward (in theory, at least) to exclude the possibility that its
actual behaviour reading abilities are what underpin its abilities to track
others’ mental states. Even in advance of knowing much about the processes
and representations involved in pure behaviour reading, the assumption that
structure extraction depends on domain-general learning mechanisms makes
it unlikely that the relatively sophisticated abilities of corvids and great apes
(say) to track others’ mental states could be underpinned by pure behaviour
reading only. We may need to look elsewhere for readily testable and plausible
hypotheses on which great apes’ and corvids’ relatively exible abilities to
track others’ mental states do not involve representing mental states.
3. End False Belief about False Belief
The overall question for this chapter is, What underpins abilities to track
others’ mental states? I started by arguing that answering this question
would require evaluating competing hypotheses. To do this requires,  rst,
identifying a theoretically coherent, empirically motivated and readily testable
hypothesis on which tracking mental states does not involve representing
2015) can learn patterns involving one non-adjacent dependency.
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mental states. But, as we have just seen, it is surprisingly dicult to do this,
at least for the most exible animals. Pure behaviour reading seemed to be
the obvious source of such hypotheses; but although the partial account of
pure behaviour reading just considered yields readily testable hypotheses,
these are already plausibly excluded by existing data. In the absence of an
alternative, should we accept, provisionally, that in at least some nonhumans,
tracking mental states does aer all involve representing them?
There are at least two obstacles to accepting this. The  rst is a false belief
about false belief. The false belief task (Wimmer and Perner 1983) is some-
times regarded as an acid test of mental state representations (see Bennett’s,
Dennett’s and Harman’s inuential responses to Premack and Woodru 1978).
Awkwardly, chimpanzees and other nonhuman animals have so far mostly
thwarted eorts to show that they can track others’ false beliefs (e.g. Call and
Tomasello 1999; Kaminski, Call and Tomasello 2008; Krachun et al. 2009, 2010;
Marticorena et al. 2011). False belief tasks continue to yield many import-
ant discoveries concerning humans (e.g. Milligan, Astington and Dack 2007;
Devine and Hughes 2014). But there are reasons to doubt that the false belief
task, despite its enormous value, is an acid test of mindreading. First, it is
possible to track others’ false beliefs without actually representing them (But-
ter ll and Apperly 2013). Second, there is evidence that typically developing
humans can represent incompatible desires before they can represent false
beliefs (Rakoczy, Warneken and Tomasello 2007). Having an ability to track
false beliefs is therefore not sucient for being able to represent beliefs and
probably not necessary for being able to represent mental states. So whether
we accept that any nonhumans can represent others’ mental states should not
hinge on whether they can track false beliefs in particular. As Premack and
Woodru (1978, p. 622) suggested, a false belief task is ‘another arrow worth
having in one’s quiver rather than the assured bullseye that the philosophers
suggest it is.’
There is a second, more challenging obstacle to accepting that some
nonhumans can represent mental states. Aer claiming that ‘chimpanzees
understand … intentions … perception and knowledge,’ Call and Tomasello
(2008) qualify their claim by adding that ‘chimpanzees probably do not un-
derstand others in terms of a fully human-like belief–desire psychology’
(p. 191). This is true. The emergence in human development of the most
sophisticated abilities to represent mental states probably depends on rich
social interactions involving conversation about the mental (Slaughter and
Gopnik 1996; Peterson and Slaughter 2003; Moeller and Schick 2006), on
linguistic abilities (Milligan, Astington and Dack 2007; Kovács 2009), and on
capacities to attend to, hold in mind and inhibit things (Benson et al. 2013;
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Devine and Hughes 2014). These are all scarce or absent in chimpanzees and
other nonhumans. So it seems unlikely that the ways humans at their most
reective represent mental states will match the ways nonhumans represent
mental states. Reecting on how adult humans talk about mental states is no
way to understand how others represent them. But then what could enable
us to understand how nonhuman animals represent mental states?
The view that tracking mental states involves representing them leaves
too many options open, as Call and Tomasello’s nuanced discussion shows.
It is not a hypothesis that generates readily testable predictions. We need a
theoretically coherent, empirically motivated and readily testable hypothesis
on which tracking mental states does involve representing mental states
(compare Heyes 2015, p. 321). Identifying such a hypothesis is the second re-
quirement we would have to meet in order to evaluate competing hypotheses
about what underpins abilities to track others’ mental states. And to meet
this second requirement we must  rst reject a dogma.
4. Reject the Dogma of Mindreading
Representing physical states, such as the masses or temperatures of things,
requires having some model of the physical. Little follows directly from the
fact that an individual can represent weight or other physical properties:
everything depends on which model of the physical underlies her capacities.
And if we ask, ‘What model of the physical characterises her thinking?’, we
 nd that there are multiple, experimentally distinguishable candidate answers
(e.g. McCloskey, Washburn and Felch 1983; Kozhevnikov and Hegarty 2001;
Oberle et al. 2005). Her physical cognition might be characterised by a
Newtonian model of the physical, or perhaps on an Aristotelian model. And
it might involve one or another measurement scheme. Perhaps, for example,
she distinguishes the weights of things relative to her abilities to move them.
Or maybe she relies on a system of comparisons. Dierent models of the
physical and dierent systems of measurement generate dierent predictions
about the limits of her abilities to track physical events.
Likewise for mental properties. The conjecture that someone can rep-
resent mental states—that she is a mindreader, or that she has a ‘theory of
mind’—does not by itself generate readily testable predictions. Everything
depends on which model of the mental characterises her mindreading.
In asking which model of the mental—or of the physical—characterises a
capacity, we are seeking to understand not how the mental or physical in fact
are but how they appear from the point of view of an individual or system.
Specifying a model is a key part of providing what Marr calls a ‘computational
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description’ of a system (Marr 1982). The model need not be thought of as
something used by the system: it is a tool the theorist uses in describing what
the system is for and broadly how it works.
When an animal is suspected of mindreading we must ask, How does
she model the mental? But it will make no sense to ask this question as
long as we are in the grip of a dogma. The dogma is that there is just one
model of the mental and representing mental states involves the use of that
model. Or, more carefully (to accommodate insights about development such
as Wellman, Fang and Peterson (2011) oer), the dogma is that all models of
the mental comprise a family in which one of the models, the best and most
sophisticated model, contains everything contained in any of the models.
The dogma implies that only animals whose capacities approximate those
humans exhibit in talking about mental states can be mindreaders. In reject-
ing the dogma we also remove any reason to make this assumption. Dierent
mindreaders may rely on dierent, incommensurable models of the mental
and dierent schemes for distinguishing mental states. Mindreading in other
animals need not be an approximate version of mindreading in adult hu-
mans any more than medieval physical thought approximates contemporary
physical theories.
To see how strange endorsing the dogma would be, contrast the mental
with the physical. The briefest encounter with the history of science reveals
that there are several models of physical phenomena like movement, mass
and temperature. Some models are more accurate but also relatively costly to
apply, while others are easier to apply but less accurate. And there appear
to be dierent kinds of physical cognition which involve dierent—and in-
commensurable—models of the physical.2 It would be astonishing to discover
that there is one privileged model such that all physical cognition can be
understood by reference to that particular model. The dogma of mindreading
tacitly guides discussion only because, by contrast with the rich array of
awed theories of the physical, there is a scarcity of scienti c theories of
desire, intention and the other mental phenomena that animals can track.
But this scarcity can be alleviated.
5. Construct Models of the Mental
To understand what underpins abilities to track others’ mental states, we
need to construct models of the mental that we can use to formulate and test
2 On human adults: McCloskey, Washburn and Felch (1983) and others cited at the start of
this section; but see White (2012) for an opposing view. On human infants: Baillargeon
(2002). On nonhuman primates: Helme et al. (2006).
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Figure 3: Mental states involve subjects having attitudes toward contents.
hypotheses about dierent mindreaders’ capacities. And, as in the physical
case, we don’t want models of the mental that are maximally accurate. Instead
we seek models good enough to underpin successful belief tracking in a useful
range of situations and simple enough that their realisation need demand
little in the way of conceptual sophistication and cognitive resources.
But what is a model of the mental? On a widely accepted view, mental
states involve subjects having attitudes toward contents (see  gure 3). Possible
attitudes include believing, wanting, intending and knowing. (Not every
model of the mental need include these attitudes.) The content is what
distinguishes one belief from all others, or one desire from all others. The
content is also what determines whether a belief is true or false, and whether
a desire is satis ed or unsatis ed.
There are two main tasks in constructing a model of mental states. The
 rst task is to characterise some attitudes. This typically involves specifying
their distinctive functional and normative roles by developing a theory of
the mental.3 The second task is to  nd a scheme for specifying the contents
of mental states. This typically involves one or another kind of proposition,
although some have suggested alternatives (e.g. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson
1996, p. 163).
One model of the mental is speci ed by minimal theory of mind (Butter ll
and Apperly 2013, 2016), which repurposes a theory oered by Bennett (1976)
in building on insights oered by Gómez (2009) and Whiten (1994) among
others. This theory—or, rather, series of nested theories—speci es states with
stripped down functional roles whose contents are distinguished by tuples
of objects and properties rather than by propositions. These features ensure
that, although minimal theory of mind is capable of underpinning abilities
to track mental states including false beliefs in a limited but useful range of
situations, realising minimal theory of mind need involve little conceptual
3 For examples, see Bratman (1987) on intention or Velleman (2000, chapter 11) on belief.
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sophistication or cognitive resources.
The construction of minimal theory of mind enables us to specify some
simple models of the mental, and to generate testable hypotheses about how
mindreaders model minds. One such hypothesis concerns infant humans. The
hypothesis is that a minimal theory of mind describes the model of the mental
which underpins mindreading processes in these subjects. A key prediction
of this hypothesis has so far mostly been con rmed (Fizke, Butter ll and
Rakoczy 2013; Low and Watts 2013; Low et al. 2014; Wang, Hadi and Low 2015;
see Low et al. 2016 for an overview), although there are some apparently
contrary  ndings too (Scott, Richman and Baillargeon 2015; Kampis and
Kovács, May 26, 2016) and some theoretical objections (e.g. Carruthers 2013,
2015a, 2015b; Christensen and Michael, forthcoming). A minimal model of
the mental might capture how minds appear from the point of view of some
mindreading processes in some humans.
Consider a related hypothesis about nonhuman animals: abilities to track
mental states in some nonhumans are underpinned by capacities to represent
mental states which involve a minimal model of the mental. (This hypothesis
was suggested by Apperly and Butter ll 2009.) This hypothesis avoids objec-
tions arising from views on which nonhumans have representational powers
whose emergence in human development involves linguistic abilities and
communicative exchanges. It also generates testable predictions about the
limits of mindreading in nonhumans, including predictions which distinguish
hypotheses about minimal theory of mind from hypotheses about pure beha-
viour reading. And there is already a hint that one such prediction is correct
(see Karg et al. 2016; they don’t mention this, but a signature limit of minimal
mindreading is inability generally to do level-2 perspective taking).
6. Distinguish Kinds of Mindreading Processes
Testing the hypothesis about minimal theory of mind in nonhumans is espe-
cially challenging, however. In humans, minimal theory of mind generates
otherwise unexpected predictions because humans typically develop abilities
to track mental states beyond anything minimal models of the mental could
underpin (e.g. Rakoczy et al. 2015). But nonhumans’ abilities to track others’
mental states are currently thought to be so limited that fewer of the predic-
tions generated by minimal theory of mind are otherwise unexpected. It may
appear that invoking minimal models of the mental will amount merely to
telling another ‘just so’ story.
Note, however, that a model of the mental is supposed to be just one
ingredient in a theory of mindreading. A model of the mental is the basis
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for a computational description (in Marr’s sense) of a mindreading system.
And although essential, no computational description by itself provides a full
theory. We will also need hypotheses about the kinds of representations and
processes mindreading involves.
Such hypotheses may be motivated by research with human subjects.
There is evidence for two (or more) mindreading processes in adult humans
(e.g. Wel, Sebanz and Knoblich 2014; Furlanetto et al. 2015). One mindreading
process is more automatic than the other in the sense that whether or not it
occurs is, to a signi cant degree, independent of your tasks and intentions. By
distinguishing the contributions of dierent kinds of mindreading processes
to performance, we may succeed in identifying processing characteristics
distinctive of automatic mindreading (e.g. Qureshi, Apperly and Samson 2010;
Todd et al *under review). It may turn out, for example, that automatic and
nonautomatic processes in humans can be distinguished by their sensitivities
to time constraints, to interruptions in perceptual processing or to cognitive
load, or by their eects on motor control versus other kinds of planning.
Discovering signature processing characteristics of automatic mindreading
in humans could allow us to test the (currently unsupported) conjecture that
some nonhumans’ capacities to track others’ mental states involve processes
similar to those that underpin automatic mindreading in humans.
This conjecture about processes can be linked to the earlier hypothesis
about models (see section 5 on page 10). There are theoretical and empirical
reasons for hypothesising that minimal models of the mental characterise
automatic mindreading only (Apperly and Butter ll 2009; Low et al. 2016).
If we can be con dent that this hypothesis holds for adult humans, con rm-
ing the conjecture linking automatic processes in humans and nonhumans
would support the view that a minimal model of the mental characterises
nonhumans’ capacities to track mental states.
The suggestions in this section are wildly speculative, of course. But
they illustrate a point that is not speculative at all. Constructing models
of the mental does enable us to identify theoretically coherent, empirically
motivated and readily testable hypotheses on which representations of mental
states underpin abilities to track them. But this is just a  rst step towards
understanding varieties of animal mindreading, one that opens the way for
further theorising about the kinds of processes that underpin mindreading.
7. Conclusion
What underpins abilities to track others’ mental states? To answer this ques-
tion we would need at least two competing hypotheses to evaluate. First,
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we would need a theoretically coherent, empirically motivated and readily
testable hypothesis on which tracking mental states does not involve repres-
enting mental states. Although no such hypothesis currently exists (Halina
2015, p. 486; Heyes 2015, p. 322), there is a body of research on behaviour
reading from which a theory capable of generating readily testable predictions
might be derived (see section 2). Second, we would need a readily testable hy-
pothesis on which representations of mental states underpin abilities to track
them. The construction of minimal theory of mind enables us to generate
one such hypothesis (see section 5).
How plausible are these hypotheses? Even in advance of having a theory
of behaviour reading, we might assume that extracting structure in behaviour
reading depends on domain-general learning mechanisms only. Given this
assumption, it seems unlikely that the relatively exible mental-state-tracking
abilities of corvids and nonhuman great apes are underpinned by behaviour
reading only (section 2). This may motivate the search for alternative theories
on which tracking others’ mental states does not involve representing them.
It may even justify accepting, provisionally at least, that at least some animals
other than humans represent mental states.
To accept this is not yet to have a theory about mindreading capable
of generating readily testable predictions, however (see section 3). Under-
standing abilities to track others’ mental states is not simply a matter of
categorising them as involving or not involving representations of mental
states. Instead we need to understand how dierent mindreaders model the
mental.
It may be tempting to rely on a pretheoretical, commonsense understand-
ing of what mental states are in formulating and testing hypotheses about
what underpins abilities to track others’ mental states. But a model implicit
in adult humans’ talk about mental states is unlikely to be the model of the
mental that characterises chimpanzees’ or corvids’ mindreading (section 4).
Because dierent mindreaders may rely on dierent, incommensurable mod-
els of the mental and dierent schemes for distinguishing mental states, we
need to identify models of the mental that we can use to generate readily
testable hypotheses about dierent mindreaders’ capacities. The construction
of minimal theory of mind illustrates how to do this.
The hypothesis that abilities to track mental states in some nonhumans
including great apes and corvids are underpinned by capacities to represent
mental states which involve a minimal model of the mental has three things
going for it. It makes precise what researchers should care about in asserting
that animals other than humans can represent others’ mental states. It isn’t
already known to be false, and there is even a hint that its predictions are
14 · Tracking and Representing Others’ Mental States
correct (section 5). And it has no theoretically coherent, empirically motivated
and readily testable competitors—at least not yet. So if a minimal model of
the mental doesn’t characterise any nonhuman animals’ abilities to track
other mental states, what does?
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